Should Election Day Become A Federal Holiday? Weighing The Benefits And Drawbacks | ACE
ace-usa.org
Election Day is always held on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November during an election year. Congress codified this tradition in 1845 to account for

Is it time to make Election Day a federal holiday? 🗳️ Some say it would boost voter turnout and align the U.S. with other democracies, while others argue it could create challenges for hourly workers and cost millions. Dive into the debate over whether a federal voting holiday is the best way to strengthen democracy or if there are better solutions. Check out the full breakdown!

https://ace-usa.org/blog/research/research-votingrights/should-election-day-become-a-federal-holiday-weighing-the-benefits-and-drawbacks/

  • chaogomu@lemmy.world
    1·
    17 天前

    Also, that site seems to ignore the fact that you can rate candidates the same under Cardinal systems, It’s pretending that everything is Borda Count, which is an overly complex system that’s only barely a cardinal system. All because their favorite system is Condorcet voting. A system with some serious flaws, but not as many as something like IRV.

    Hell, their Range voting example is just fucking weird. Why would you have to choose to rate the candidates lower? If the two candidates are equally appealing to Dems, why didn’t they both get equally high scores?

    It’s all nonsense. Just vote how you want under Cardinal systems because strategic voting only hurts you. Seriously, that’s the take away of that site. Be honest and be rewarded, be contrived and “strategic” and you lose.

    This explains it better

    Rated voting Main article: Rated voting

    Because rated voting methods are not affected by Arrow’s theorem, they can be both spoilerproof (satisfy IIA) and ensure positive vote weights at the same time. Taken together, these properties imply that increasing the rating of a favorite candidate can never change the result, except by causing the favorite candidate to win; therefore, giving a favorite candidate the maximum level of support is always the optimal strategy.

    Examples of systems that are both spoilerproof and monotonic include score voting, approval voting, and highest medians.